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Until recently, justice in education has not attracted much attention.
However, social justice has been an exception for many years, above all in
the Anglo-American philosophy of education. The main reason was the
first publication of John Rawls’ book A Theory of Justice (1971), which
has significantly influenced not only political philosophy, but also the
philosophy of education. According to Rawls, justice should be seen as
the first virtue of social institutions, and should no longer be perceived
only as a value to be weighed alongside the others (such as freedom,
rights or the common good). It should, therefore, be seen as »the stan-
dard by which we assign weight to other values«.1 If we accept Rawls’ the-
sis, then justice should be the first virtue of educational institutions as
well. However, the problem is knowing what the central issues of justice
are. Different conceptions of justice provide different answers.
In this paper, the author discusses two topics related to justice in educa-
tion: educational assessment and punishment.
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Just educational assessment
The application of the well-known classical Aristotelian principle of
justice (i.e., equals must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated
unequally) to educational assessment requires that all students being ex-
amined who are members of the same or equivalent school class and who
demonstrate equal knowledge, learning achievement or whatever is de-
fined as the object of assessment and grading get equal grades. If teachers
violate this principle and give different grades to such students, then they
assess them unjustly. Whether one student gets a higher or a lower grade
than the others is not important here. In any case, one is given a different
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1 Kymlicka, W. »Introduction«, in: Kymlicka, W. (ed.), Justice in Political Philosophy,
p. xii.
and thus unjust grade. It is unjust and morally unjustifiable also because
the student who gets the grade does not deserve it.2
This formal rule of justice, therefore, requires that teachers must
treat all students within the same school class equally. However, what
does this mean? Firstly, this means that teachers must be impartial. Their
impartiality requires that they ignore all differences between their stu-
dents other than those of knowledge and achievement. Secondly, it means
that they must use the same assessment criteria.3
If teachers apply the same criteria, the assessment criteria they use
seem not to be important. However, such a conclusion leads to a para-
doxical situation – assessment injustice can arise even though teachers
use the same criteria when assessing students who belong to the same
school class and they, therefore, assess them equally; and if equally, then
– according to the rule of formal justice – also justly. Let us say that two
teachers teaching the same school subject in two parallel classes in the
same school use different assessment criteria. Students in both classes are
assessed equally and, therefore, justly. However, on the school level, such
assessment practice is – considering the same rule of formal justice –
unjust, since students in similar classes are assessed unequally. Assess-
ment practices in schools prove the existence of such assessment injustice
not only on the level of schools but also on the national level, simply
because teachers use different assessment criteria in different schools.
Therefore, assessment justice within each individual class, which is under-
stood as the assessment of all students in a particular class in accordance
with the same criteria,4 does not prevent assessment injustice as such.5 If
all teachers were to use exactly the same assessment criteria, such injusti-
ce would be eliminated. However, this is, at best, an ideal, which teachers
should try to achieve, and not a reality.
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2 Students feel and describe assessment injustice as arbitrary grading. For them, both
over-graded and under-graded knowledge or competence are comparable to revenge and
unjustified punishment (Dubet, F. »Sentiments et jugements de justice dans l’expérience
scolaire«, in: Meuret, D. (ed.), La jusstice du système éducatif, p. 181). Dearden also states
that »Wrongly to assess a person is not simply to make a mistake but, particularly if he is un-
der-rated, also to do him an injustice.« (Dearden, R. F. »The Assessment of Learning«, p. 115)
3 With respect to complex achievement there may be some disagreement over the cri-
teria in terms of what counts, or – more likely – disagreement over the relative importance
of the criteria. (ibid., p. 117)
4 This is not a sufficient, but only a necessary condition of assessment justice.
5 Therefore, in the case of assessment in education, justice as the virtue of teachers is
not sufficient for ensuring just assessment. According to Rawls, just assessment also re-
quires justice as the virtue of social institutions (schools, national systems of assessment in
education).
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Moreover, even if it were possible to make teachers use the same
assessment criteria, some teachers would perhaps disagree with assessing
students according to the same criteria, because they might believe that it
would be unjust. For grade inequalities to be fully deserved, both know-
ledge and learning achievement inequalities must not be ascribed to stu-
dents’ family, economic and/or cultural backgrounds.
Let us suppose that the teachers of the schools attended by more or
less disadvantaged students are persuaded, on the one hand, that their
students know, on the average, less than the students of other, compa-
rable schools, and that, on the other hand, the students’ inferior know-
ledge and lower learning achievements are not the consequence of diffe-
rences in individual abilities, talents and efforts exerted, but rather of the
economic and cultural disadvantages under which the students live. In
such circumstances – i.e., when students in different schools are not pro-
vided equal opportunities for education – such teachers might believe
that it would be unjust to assess them using the same criteria, such as ex-
ternally administrated standardised tests. Even if all standardised tests
were unbiased and as fair as possible for the test takers of different races,
genders, ethnic backgrounds or disabilities, the assessment system would
not ensure that all students receive fair treatment, thus avoiding limiting
the students’ future educational opportunities. It is highly possible that
students who do not have equal opportunities for education get lower
grades in standardised tests. It is for this reason that their opportunity to
enrol in prestigious secondary schools are restricted – not because of
their possible lower intellectual abilities or lesser effort exerted, but as
the result of other factors (bad social conditions and non-stimulating en-
vironment in which they live; the schools they attend are not as well
equipped as other schools, and that is why they cannot offer the same op-
portunities for learning; the State does not provide disadvantaged stu-
dents with compensatory education programmes and other forms of assis-
tance, which could – at least in some part – reduce the unequal educa-
tional opportunities, etc.). Since such students are – through no choice of
their own – disadvantaged compared to the students of other schools,
their teachers may understand helping them as their duty, and could also
believe that they have a moral obligation to mend this injustice and re-
dress the balance between the advantaged and disadvantaged groups of
students so far as they possibly can. It is obvious that they cannot elimi-
nate externally administrated standardised or national tests, particularly
if they are an integral part of the assessment system. However, in those
assessment systems, such as the one in Slovenia, where the final grades
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given at the end of obligatory schooling are composed of two equal pro-
portions – one pertains to the results of the final external assessment,
whereas the other proportion to the final grades given by the teachers
themselves – they can try to improve the future educational opportunities
and their students’ chances in life by intentionally either over-grading
their knowledge or using lower criteria in internal assessment. In this way,
their students would get better grades in terms of internal assessment
and, consequently, better final grades as well. This is decisive for the fu-
ture educational opportunities of their students, since the doors of good
secondary schools thus open for them.
Despite the arbitrary raise of grades – or the lowering of the assess-
ment criteria – assessment on the level of schools is still just if teachers,
when raising grades, do not make distinctions between students, and if all
students get equally higher grades. However, this is unfair in relation to
the students of other schools, in which teachers do not raise grades. What
might, in fact, happen to the students of such schools is that they – in spite
of their better knowledge – may not enrol in the school of their choice,
since their final grade is lower than the final grade of the students whose
internal grade was raised. The teachers’ good intention to amend the in-
justice by either over-grading their students or by simply lowering the cri-
teria of internal assessment might result in injustice on the national level.
This poses a number of questions: Are the teachers’ actions justifiable?
Are they morally acceptable? There is no simple answer. According to
utilitarian ethics – for which the only criteria of morality are (either the
good or bad) consequences of action – the teachers’ over-grading or low-
ering the assessment criteria is not only morally acceptable but also obli-
gatory in the moral sense, provided that the consequences of such actions
are better than the consequences of some other possible actions. How-
ever, the problem is that teachers cannot know in advance whether the
consequences of their lowering the assessment criteria or over-grading
are going to be better than the consequences of them not doing so. It be-
comes possible to prove whether their actions were morally justified or
not only once all the positive and negative consequences are calculated.
Yet, positive consequences can be achieved only on condition that not all
teachers over-grade their students or lower the assessment criteria. If all
teachers were to over-grade their students or lower the assessment crite-
ria the effects of their actions would be worthless. Therefore, their subjec-
tive principle of assessment cannot be universalised without, at the same
time, nullifying exactly the results to be attained in this particular way.
Since it is impossible to consistently will that the teachers’ subjective prin-
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ciple of action be raised to universality – since this will would then contra-
dict itself – lowering the assessment criteria or over-grading some stu-
dents is, within the context of Kant’s ethics, morally unacceptable. Kant’s
formulation of the Categorical Imperative as a universal law clearly sta-
tes: »Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will
that it should become a universal law.«6 Having defined maxims as »sub-
jective principles of action«,7 Kant, therefore, »thinks that the maxims
that we should act on are ones that could be universally acted on.«8 For
this reason, it seems that the maxims that cannot consistently be willed as
universal laws are, according to Onora O’Nill, »those that if acted on by
some cannot then be acted on by others. If, for example, successful action
on a maxim will in principle preclude others from successfully making that
maxim the basis of their action, then the maxim is not universalisable.«9
Therefore, if »certain principles of action that can coherently be adopted
by some cannot coherently be adopted by all«, then »justice, taken in the
traditional, minimal, formal sense of like requirements for like cases, will
then require that those principles be rejected.«10
In any case, either over-grading or lowering the assessment criteria
in some schools in order to rectify social injustice – the victims of which
are disadvantaged students – induces assessment injustice on either re-
gional or national levels. Past wrongs done to disadvantaged students
cannot be either rectified or settled by actuating a new form of injustice,
regardless of the fact that schools must fight for social justice and tend
both the vocational and personal needs of all students equally well and
just those who enrol with comparative advantages.
Just punishment in education
According to the retributive theory, any punishment is just if and
only if it is deserved. This means that punishment must be inflicted only
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6 Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, IV, 421. »We must be able to will
that a maxim of our action should become a universal law – this is the general cannon for all
moral judgment of action. Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be
conceived as a universal law of nature without contradiction, let alone be willed as what
ought to become one. In the case of others we do not find this inner impossibility, but it is
still impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of na-
ture, because such a will would contradict itself.« (ibid., 424)
7 Ibid., 421n.
8 O’Neill, O. Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, p. 151.
9 Ibid., p. 156.
10 Ibid., p. 215.
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in consequence of an offence committed. In other words, in consequence
of a real and not merely a supposed offence committed deliberately by a
real (and not merely a supposed) offender who is thereby responsible for
what (s)he has done. On the other hand, however, to say that punishment
is just only when it is deserved is not to say that deserved punishment is
always just. It is always unjust when it is excessive, when a severe or even
cruel punishment is inflicted for a minor offence. The opposite is also
valid – punishment is always unjust when it is too mild in respect of the
offence committed, i.e., when there is no proportionality between the
offence committed and the punishment imposed. Therefore, any punish-
ment is just only when it is deserved and, at the same time, not excessive
and disproportionate to the offence committed.11 This means that unde-
served punishment is always unjust. And when is it undeserved? It »is un-
deserved if imposed on the innocent, or if the offence is not a real offen-
ce, or if the punishment is excessive«(McCloskey, 1962, p. 325). Since
punishment of the innocent is not deserved (because an innocent person
is, by definition, someone who has not committed a real offence) it is also
unjust (because punishment is just only on condition that it is deserved).
Punishment of the innocent is, therefore, always unjust.
However, as has already been mentioned, from the fact that unde-
served punishment – within the framework of retributivism – is always
unjust it does not follow that all deserved punishment is just. For deser-
ved punishment to be just, it must, in respect of severity, be proportionate
to the offence committed. Therefore, just punishment demands that the
most severe punishments be inflicted for the most serious offences and
that less severe punishments be inflicted for less serious offences. For this
reason it is impossible to punish justly if punishment stands in accordance
with the well-known principle of justice, which requires that equals be
treated equally. For, if a just treatment is defined as the equal treatment
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11 The conditions of just punishment are examined in more detail by Primoratz in his
book Justifying Legal Punishment (1997) and by McClosky in his article »The Complexity of
the Concepts of Punishment« (1962). These conditions are similar yet not identical with the
conditions which must be satisfied for any punishment to be a punishment. Flew’s set of five
conditions of punishment are perhaps the most well-known conditions: »(1) Punishment
must involve an evil, unpleasantness to the victim. (2) It must be for an offence (actual or
supposed). (3) It must be of an offender (actual or supposed). (4) It must be the work of
personal agencies, not merely natural consequences of an action. (5) It must be imposed by
authority (real or supposed) conferred by the system of rules against which the offence has
been committed« (Flew, A. »The justification of Punishment«, pp. 291–307). These condi-
tions are also accepted by Benn and Peters in their book Social Principles and the Demo-
cratic State (1959), who, however, added a sixth condition: »The unpleasantness must be an
essential part of what is intended, and not merely incidental.« (McClosky, H. J. »The Com-
plexity of the Concepts of Punishment«, p. 321)
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of all those who are equal, then the behaviour of teachers or headmasters
punishing all their students who committed the same minor offence with
the same extreme severity is, in fact, just, although cruel (cf. Perelman,
1990, p. 182). Since proportionate punishment also means that offences
of equal seriousness must be matched with punishments of equal severity,
it seems unjust to inflict punishments of differing severity on students
who committed offences of equal seriousness. »If two students both vio-
late the same rule but one is given a more severe penalty, we would pre-
sume (knowing no more facts) that comparative injustice had been com-
mitted by the teacher. Unless some relevant difference between the two
offenders or their offences could be brought to light by the teacher, we
would treat the presumption as decisive« (Feinberg, 1991, p. 346). Such
unequal punishment for the equal offence can, therefore, be just pro-
vided that there are one or more relevant differences between the stu-
dents who committed the offence. Let us suppose that two students have
both left school without permission; however, one has committed this of-
fence for the first time, whereas the other has repeated it several times. In
this case, inflicting a lighter penalty on the former offender and a heavier
penalty on the latter is usually taken as just punishment on condition, of
course, that other mitigating and aggravating circumstances are irrelevant
for both students. Just punishment, thus, requires that mitigating or ag-
gravating circumstances be considered. There is a widespread agreement
that the infliction of equal punishment would be unjust in, for example,
the following cases: two individual students use very abusive language and
gestures in school, but one does it for fun, whereas the other because he is
provoked by the victim of his/her foul language, or two individual stu-
dents damage school property, but one does it involuntarily and out of
negligence, whereas the other acts deliberately, etc. However, in the ab-
sence of any diverse mitigating or aggravating circumstances, justice de-
mands equal punishment. This, of course, does not imply »that for every
offence there is a punishment absolutely equal to it in severity, and that
we ought to prescribe such punishment for each and every offence, once
and for all.« If this was required, »we would soon reach the conclusion
that it is impracticable and that, consequently, every or almost every pun-
ishment inflicted is unjust and unacceptable.« (Primoratz, 1997, p. 81; cf.
Ewing, 1929, p. 39–40)
Within this context, the previously stated assertion that justice de-
mands equal punishment of all students from the same class or school
who committed the same offence or offences of comparable gravity (ex-
cept when there exist different mitigating or aggravating circumstances)
means that students who committed offences of »comparable gravity
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should receive punishments of comparable severity.« (cf. Hirsh, 1990, pp.
259–290)
With respect to the retributive philosophical theory of just punish-
ment, it is, therefore, clear that only the guilty students deserve punish-
ment, and that this should be proportionate to the gravity of their of-
fences. However, does this only mean that the innocent should not be
punished and that excessive and disproportionate punishments of the
guilty are forbidden, or does it also mean that guilty students ought to be
punished as they deserve? Some authors, whose theoretical position lies
between utilitarianism (consequentialism) and retributivism,12 understand
guilt as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of just and justified
punishment. For this reason, punishment of the innocent and excessive
(i.e., disproportionately severe) punishment of the guilty is for them – as
it is to strict retributivists – unjust, morally wrong and unacceptable. On
the other hand, however, they also think that the offences committed do
not impose the duty to punish those who committed them. Offences give
only the right to punish the guilty and nothing more. Only when punish-
ment is deserved and its consequences are beneficial, the sufficient condi-
tions of punishment are fulfilled. Like traditional utilitarians, they main-
tain that punishment is not justified when its consequences are not good.
If good consequences (or at least effective deterrent effects) can be
achieved by inflicting lighter punishments than the retributive criterion of
proportionality requires, disproportionately lenient punishments are jus-
tified. On the other hand, retributivists hold that disproportionately leni-
ent punishment is unjust (because offenders do not get what they deserve
74
12 They have attempted to bridge the gap between the utilitarian and retributive theory
of punishment »which seem to be mutually opposed and even irreconcilable« (Primoratz,
Justifying Legal Punishment, p. 112). Among those who »hold that the way leading to a satis-
factory theory is the middle way, that the theory of punishment must be a synthetic one which
would avoid the one-sidedness, exaggerations, and outright mistakes of both utilitarianism
and retributivism, while incorporating the important insights contained in both«, Primoratz
analyses the theories defended by A. M. Quinton, A. C. Ewing, rule-utilitarianists, R. M. Hare
and H. L. A. Hart (ibid., pp. 111–143), whose definition of punishment has a number of times
been also taken as a starting point of the discussion on the problem of punishment in educa-
tion. Although these theories of punishment »have in common a willingness to find room for
considerations of justice and desert, … justice is [except in Hart’s theory] never seen as a truly
independent moral principle. It is either a mere logical appendix to utilitarian ethical theory
(Quinton), or a means to a utilitarian end (Ewing), or a rule of an institution justified by its
utility, and accordingly a rule predicated on its own utility (rule-utilitarianism, Hare’s two-
level theory)« (ibid., pp. 140–141). Justice understood in this way cannot rule out the possibili-
ty of unjust punishment, if the latter is expedient. Hart’s theory, on the contrary, includes jus-
tice as an independent principle and »rule[s] out injustice in punishment such as dispropor-
tionately harsh penalties, punishment of the irresponsible, or ‘punishment’ of the innocent, …
but it would justify disproportionately lenient penalties.« (ibid., pp. 141–142)
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in respect of the seriousness of the offences committed), and that the
non-punishment of the guilty is unjustified (because they deserve to be
punished). It follows that offenders should not only be punished justly,
but also that they must be punished regardless of the deterrent, reforming
or educative consequences. According to Kant, one of the most radical
proponents of the retributive philosophy of punishment, »no infringe-
ment of school law must be allowed to remain unpunished« (Kant, 1987,
p. 125). In fact, all »disobedience entails punishment« (ibid., p. 128).
Since »all transgression of a command by a child is a lack of obedience, …
this entails punishment. Even if the transgression is due simply to negli-
gence, punishment is not unnecessary« (ibid., p. 126–127). Moreover,
Kant also stresses that, »the punishment must always fit the offence«
(ibid., p. 125). According to Kant, no breach of school law and no lack of
obedience must, therefore, stay unpunished; however, any punishment
should always be in accordance with the seriousness of the offence com-
mitted. In this regard, punishment in education seems to be a simple ap-
plication of Kant’s theory of juridical punishment as explained in his
Metaphysics of Morals. However, his Reflections on Education also con-
tains the following significant statement: »As a general rule, punishment
must be inflicted on children with great caution and in such a manner that
they may understand that its only aim is their improvement« (ibid., p.
128). Since the only aim of punishment in education is the improvement
of children, it is obvious that the reason for inflicting punishment in edu-
cation differs radically from the reason for administering juridical punish-
ment, which »can never be administered merely as a means of promoting
another good, either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society,
but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is
inflicted has committed a crime« (Kant, 1966, p. 158).13 Thus, there is no
doubt that Kant’s principles of child punishment are, in this regard, in
conflict with his juridical theory of punishment, which »pretends to ex-
clude every utilitarian and also educative conception of punishment«, for,
otherwise, children ought to be punished only because they have commit-
ted offences (Philonenko, 1987, p. 126). If juridical punishment were
aimed at improving offenders – from the retributive point of view – they
would have to be treated as immature, unfree and irresponsible beings
who may legitimately be improved by »others in accordance with their no-
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13 The importance of this distinction within Kant’s theory of punishment is pointed
out by Philonenko in his text »Kant et le probleme de l’éducation«, which serves as the »In-
troduction« to Kant’s book Réflections sur l’éducation (Philonenko, 1987, pp. 29, 126–127n.
124).
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tions of what is good, desirable and socially acceptable« (Primoratz, 1997,
p. 35). Such a conception of juridical punishment is unacceptable for re-
tributivists, who see punishment »as a reaction that is fully determined …
by the free action of the offender, an action for which he is responsible
and by which he has accordingly deserved to be punished« (ibid., p. 34).
However, if just and deserved punishment presupposes – as a neces-
sary condition – that the offender is a human being who »decides and acts
freely, and therefore bears responsibility for his decisions and actions«
(ibid., p. 34), then the following crucial question arises: is this theory of
punishment relevant to the problem of just punishment in education, or –
more precisely – in school? At first sight, it seems that it is not because
children, by virtue of their immaturity, cannot be held responsible for
their actions. In this regard and with respect to Kant’s previously men-
tioned distinction between juridical punishment and the punishment of
children, the assertion that »more important than the justice of the pun-
ishment in education is its point or purpose« (McCloskey, 1962, p. 313)
sounds reasonable. However, if justice is here understood as less impor-
tant because in education it is insufficient for the moral justification of
the punishment of children, does this also mean that punishment justice
in education is only one value amongst many others, and not »the first vir-
tue of social institutions«, which, »no matter how efficient and well-
arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust« (Rawls, 1999,
p. 3)? An affirmative answer to this question seems to be disputable, for
»if there is to be any general justification of the institution of punishment
at all, then punishments must, as far as possible, be just and fair. If all
punishments were unjust we would no longer be able to support the insti-
tution of punishment« (Marshall, 1975, p. 153).
On the other hand, however, the presupposition that the retributive
theory of punishment is irrelevant to the question of the punishment of
students in school – because children, by virtue of their immaturity, can-
not be held responsible for their actions – is problematic, since this is not
true of students who attend the final year, for example, of secondary
school. The retributive theory of punishment, which treats offenders as
rational, free and responsible persons, seems to be also applicable in vari-
ous school situations.14 Final year secondary school students should, in
76
14 It is difficult to answer the question of when it is exactly that »children reach the
stage when we can treat them fully as persons« because »there is no magical age at which a
sudden transformation takes place« (Peters, R. S. 1980, p. 289). But if »it will only occur if
children are treated progressively as if they are persons« (ibid., p. 289), then it seems that if
students younger than those in their final year of secondary education are punished in
school, they should also be progressively treated as if they are persons.
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fact, be treated in the same way as any other adult – as a person. What
does this mean within the context of punishment in school situations?
This means that a student who is punished because (s)he has committed
an offence, which had been the result of his/her free action and for which
(s)he is held responsible, is punished because (s)he deserves it. And to
treat him »according to his deserts is to relate to him as a responsible and
free being. Freedom is a manifestation of rationality, thus, to recognise
another’s freedom is to recognise him as a rational being. Freedom and
rationality pertain to persons. Accordingly, when an offender is punished
because he has committed an offence, he is being recognised as a person,
and respect is shown to that which is distinctively human in him, that
which gives him the dignity that sets him apart from all other beings – his
freedom and rationality« (Primoratz, 1997, p. 79). Therefore, according
to the retributive theory of punishment, when students are punished, they
are also being treated as persons. They are treated as free beings respon-
sible for their actions. Punishment that »recognises and, indeed, affirms
the personhood of the person punished« and that »treats the person as a
subject to whom justice is due« can be, as Kleinig emphasises, »viewed as
compatible with the ends of education« (Kleinig, 1982, p. 239). The con-
trary, however, i.e. unjust punishment – such as the punishment of inno-
cent students and collective punishment of the whole class when a certain
number of students are innocent – should not be recognised as compati-
ble with the ends of education, even if the achieved deterrent or other ef-
fects are outstanding. To punish innocent students in order to secure dis-
cipline or for some other valuable educational purpose would mean to
treat such students merely as a means to such ends and not as ends in
themselves. Since any such punishment is the very opposite of the cate-
gorical imperative, it is thereby also morally unacceptable within the con-
text of Kant’s deontological ethics.
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PRAVDA U ODGOJU: DVA PRIMJERA
Zdenko Kodelja
Do nedavno, pravda u odgoju nije privlaèila mnogo pozornosti. Ipak kroz dulje
vrijeme izuzetak je bila, naroèito u Anglo-Amerièkoj filozofiji odgoja, društvena prav-
da. Glavni je razlog bio objavljivanje knjige Johna Rawlsa A Theory of Justice
(1971.), koja je imala sna®an utjecaj ne samo na politièku filozofiju nego i na filo-
zofiju odgoja. Prema Rawlsu, na pravdu treba gledati kao na prvu vrlinu društvenih
ustanova a ne samo kao vrijednost pored drugih (takvih kao sloboda, prava, ili opæe
dobro). Dosljedno tome treba vidjeti »standard kojim mi odreðujemo te®inu drugim
vrijednostima«. Ako mi prihvatimo Rawlsovu postavku, tada pravda kao takva treba
biti prva vrlina odgojnih ustanova. Ali problem je: kako znati koja su centralna pi-
tanja pravde. Razlièite koncepcije pravde daju nam razlièite odgovore. U ovom èlan-
ku ja æu raspravljati, ukratko, dvije stvari vezane za pravdu u odgoju: odgojno vred-
novanje i ka®njavanje.
Kljuène rijeèi: ka®njavanje, odgoj, pravda, vrednovanje
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